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NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Pia in tiff-Appellant 
vs. 
WESTERN CASUALTY AND 
SURETY COMPANY, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Defendant-Res pendent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15317 
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant, National Farmers 
Union Property and Casualty Company, against defendant-respondent, 
Western Casualty and Surety Company, whereby plaintiff is attempting 
to recover from defendant monies paid in settlement of a tQrt claim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Motions for summary judgment filed by both parties were heard 
by Judge Dean E. Conder on the 9th day of fune, 1977. Based upon the 
Written and oral arguments, the court ordered that plaintiff s motion for 
51 
nirnary judgment be denied and that defendant s motion for summary judg-
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RELIEF S8UGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the order granting defendant's motion 
for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Western agrees with the statement of facts as set forth in the 
plaintiff's brief, except in the following important particulars. First of all, 
it is implied in plaintiff's brief that Western or Story agreed to pay $12,500 
which is net.the case at all· Defendant denies that it has an obligation to 
pay what plaintiff classifies as Brent G. Story's proportionate share. Secon; 
plaintiff represents in its brief that there is no dispute as to whether coverc:' 
is provfded under either of the insurance policies involved in this case. As 
will be pointed out more thoroughly in Point III of this brief, defendant takes 
the position that coverage under its insurance policy was excluded by 
Specific Exclusion l (e). 
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY AMOUNT FROM 
DEFENDANT UNDER A THEORY OF SUBROGATION OR CONTRI-
BUTION BECAUSE AN INSURER MAY NOT RECOVER FROM ITS 
OWN INSURED OR CO-INSURED. 
In the Declaration of plaintiff's insurance policy, the named 
insured, Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse, is identified as a 
corporation, and in light of that, Brent G. Story, as captain of the Sher!fi' 5 
Posse, is an insured under plaintiff's policy, which reads as follows: Sec 
2, Persons Insured: 
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"Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to 
the extent set forth below: 
"(c) If the named insured is designated in the Declarations as 
other than an individual, partners hip or joint venture, the 
organization so designated and any executive officer, director 
or stockholder thereof while acting within the scope of his 
duties as such." (emphasis added) 
In light of this language there is no question therefore, that both the Posse 
and Brent G. Story as an officer of the Posse were co-insureds under plain-
tiff's policy. Under the holding of a very recent Utah Supreme Court decision, 
it is now clear that in Utah an insurer may not bring an action against one of 
its co-insureds under a theory of subrogation. 
In Board of Education of fordan School District v. Hales, 566 P. Zd 
124 7 (Utah July 5, 19 77) , the plaintiff, Board of Education, had entered into 
a contractual arrangement with the general contractor, Paulsen and 
, 
Christiansen (not parties to that action), for the construction of Bingham 
High School. Plaintiff then obtained a "builders risk" insurance policy 
insuring the interests of the Board of Education, the general contractor 
specifically named, and "subcontractors". The general contractor then entered 
into a subcontract with defendants in that action. Sometime later a fire broke 
out at the construction site and under the policy the plaintiff's insurance 
carriers paid claims amounting to $58,824.00, of which $720.00 was paid to 
defendants. 
Plaintiffs insurance carriers, then instituted an action in subrogation 
~' 1 ' 1 '- Jc?tendanl 'Nhom they alleged was liable under a theory of negligence 
- ' c loss caused by the fire. They were attempting to collect from defendants 
-3-
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all of the money paid out by the insurance carriers except for the $ 720 .00 ;: 
to defendants. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of def~:· 
dants and the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that an insurance carr!e: 
not maintain a subrogation action against a co-insured. In this decision, 
court merely adopted a generally recognized legal principle and made the 
following observations: 
"Yet courts have consistently held that where an insurance 
company attempts to recover, as a subrogee, from a co-
insured generally covered under a fire insurance policy, 
the action must fail in the absence of design or fraud on 
the part of the co-insured. 
"An insurer which accepts a premium based partially on the 
inclusion of a co-insured under a policy of insurance has 
assumed the risk of its negligence. We agree with the 
reasoning of Mr. Justice Guittard, in his dissenting opinion 
in the McBroome case, (515 S.W. 2d 32 Texas 1974): "The 
insurer, which has accepted one premium covering the entire 
property and has assumed the risk of the negligence of each 
insured party, ought not to be allowed to shift the risk to 
any one of them." [515 S. W. 2d, p. 44] 
"We hold that the District Court properly entered summary 
judgment on the ground that an insurance carrier may not 
maintain a subrogation action against a party insured under 
its policy. • • . " 
One case that is often cited throughout the country for the princi;. 
enunciated in Board of Education, is Home Insurance Co. v. Pinski srot~ 
Inc., 500 P. 2d 945 (Montana 1972). In ·that case the insurers who had paiC 
off an extensive amount on property damage loss brought an action against 
an architect firm whom they alleged was the negligent party. The architec: 
firm was insured through an indemnity firm which the court found was 
really the same corporate entity as the plaintiff-insurer. In holding the' 
the insurer in this case could not bring a subrogation action again~L ·•·.· 
-4-
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architects, the court elaborated on some of the policy reasons for this 
ger.eral rule: 
"To permit the insurer to sue its own insured for a liability 
covered by the insurance policy would violate these basic 
equity principles, as well as violate sound public policy. 
Such action, if permitted, would (1) allow the insurer to 
expend premiums collected from its insured to secure a 
judgment against the same insured on a risk insured against: 
(2) give judicial sanciton to the breach of the insurance policy 
by the insurer; (3) permit the insurer to secure information 
from its insured under the guise of policy provisions available 
for later use in the insurer's subrogation action against its own 
insured; (4) allow the insurer to take advantage of its conduct 
and conflict of interest with its insured; and (5) constitute 
judicial approval of a breach of the insurer's relationship with 
its own insured." 500 P.Zd at 949. 
As in the Board of Education case, the court in Pinski Brothers affirmed 
che summary judgment granted to the defendant at the trial court level. 
For further elaboration on the generally recognized principle that 
an insurer cannot bring an action against one of its co-insureds, see 
Bucoda Trailer Park, Inc. v. State, 561 P.Zd 1100 (Wash. 1977); 16 Couch 
on Insurance Zd, §61:133; and, 6AAppleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 
§4055. 
Although the Board of Education and the other cases cited above 
invobed actions directly against the co-insured, it is of course a logical 
and rational extension of the holding of those cases that an action against 
an additional insurer of the co-insured would also be precluded. In United 
~Fire Ins. Co. v. Beach, 2752o.2d473 (La.App. 1973), the Louisianna 
::our• considered a case very similar to the facts of the Utah Board of 
~~'~2-'-@_case. Some $54,000.00 had apparently been paid out by United 
~tr': lns•1rance Company (USFIC) on a claim for fire loss on a policy 
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from his own insured on the theory of indemnity any more 
than that of subrogation, for the same considerations that 
lead to denial of recovery on the one theory apply to the other. 
Were it otherwise, the value of insurance against liability 
for negligent acts would be greatly impaired ... "90 N.W. 2d 
at 142. 
Plaintiff has taken the position that its action against defendant 
arises either under a theory of subrogation or contribution. If plaintiff's 
action arises under the theory of contribution, then it is based upon the sa.~' 
principles as an action for indemnity, i.e. reimbursement is sought agains: 
one primarily liable for the loss. Consequently, as was stated in~. 
the same considerations that lead to the denial of recovery against the co-
insured in a subrogation action apply in an action under the theory of 
contribution or indemnity. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF ISSUED A POLICY TO COVER THE PARTICULAR 
RISK AND LOSS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. DEFENDANT'S 
P0Lx:¥ PROVIDED ONLY GENERAL OR BLANKET COVERAGE. 
PLAINTIFF'S POLICY COVERING THE SPECIFIC RISK IS 
PRIMARY AND DEFENDANT'S POLICY IS EXCESS . 
Even if plaintiff was entitled to bring an action against defendant 
as an insurer of the co-insured under plaintiff's policy, the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of defendant should still be affirmed because 
of the specific vs. general policy rule adopted by the Utah Supreme court, 
and recognized in plaintiff's brief. 
The problem as identified by plaintiff's brief on this particular point 
is a problem of the interpretation of two insurance policies both of which 1' 
,. 
except for Exclusion l(e) of defendants policy, to cover the same risk. 0 • 
policies provide for pro-rata sharing of liability when there are two er "' 
policies which cover the same loss on the same basis. Plaintiff's ~olic<i 
as follows: 
-8- ft: 
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"If any of such other insurance does not provide for contribution 
by equal shares, this company shall not be liable for a greater 
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability 
under this policy for such loss bears to the total applicable 
limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against 
such loss." 
Defendants policy reads as follows: 
"This company shall not be liable for a greater proportion 
of any loss than the amount hereby insured shall bear to 
the whole insurance covering the property against the peril 
involved, whether collectible or not." 
Where both policies cover exactly the same risk on exactly the same 
basis, it is, of course, consistent with basic notions of fairness that 
each should be liable for a pro-rata share of the loss. This is, however, 
not the case where the coverage does not apply on the same basis. Where one 
insurer has undertaken to insure one particular risk and has issued its policy 
to specifically cover that one particular risk, it should be held to be primary 
and required to bear the entire loss. 
Applied to the instant case, the insurance under plaintiff's policy 
was obtained by Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse for the specific 
Purpose of insuring against liability of the Posse and its officers, directors 
and stockholders while acting within the scope of their duties as such and 
upon the specific property mentioned in the policy plaintiff issued to 
the Posse. On the other hand, the insurance obtained by Brent G. Story 
from defendant is under a standard homeowner' s policy covering fire, 
theft, natural disaster, and the general liability coverage for the insured 
and '1is family. In other words, defendant's policy of insurance provides what 
' ''' 1 ~1 unlv known as blanket or general insurance, and the policy of 
1 ~; ·,: Lft 2 r 0 ' 1 ldes specific insurance . 
... 
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Plaintiff articulates very thoroughly in its brief that there is a 
great deal of diversity in the cases regarding the proµer treatment of 
insurance policies, both technically covering the same risk, but the one 
providing blanket insurance and the other specific insurance. Many 
jurisdictions throughout the country refuse to recognize the distinction 
of specific vs. general or blanket, and instead examine the "Other Insu:::.:: 
clauses of the policies and decide whether the language reveals an excess 
and a primary insurer or whether the language simply provides for a pro-
ration of liability. 
Plaintiff argues that it favors what it classifies as a minority 
position, and that the Utah court should break loose of the precedents o: 
the past and adopt the minority view. That view stated by plaintiff is t'.:a: 
_where there is concurrent insurance coverage and the "Other Insurance" 
clause of one liability policy conflicts with a similar clause of the other 
liability policy, the clauses are mutually repugnant and the insurers shoe:: 
be required to share the loss in proportion to the limits of their respective 
policies. 
Apparently, plaintiff conglomerates a lot of other plans handed 
down by the courts into what it calls the "majority rule". The important 
point with regard to plaintiff's total discuss ion, is that the better reasor.e: 
rule and the one apparently adopted by the Utah Supreme Court is the cne 
commonly known as the "Pennsylvania Rule", irrespective of where it 
fits in to the majority vs. minority discuss ion. Simply put, the Pennsyl''' 
Rule would treat all specific insurance policies as primary insurance a~~ 
blanket insurance policies as excess or secondary insurance. 
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==r.nsylvania courts have stated it, under such facts there is no longer 
;ny "double insurance". Under this treatment then, plaintiff would 
~ 2 : oe entitled to come against defendant on the theory of subrogation 
:s:ause where the primary insurance carrier rightfully undertakes its 
J2ligation and pays all or part of the policy coverage, it has no right to 
:e subrogated to the rights of the insured or an injured party and to 
:ecover from a secondary insurer of the same insured and the same risk. 
Xational Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 
14 etah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1963). Secondly, defendant being found an 
2xces s insurer, would not be liable to the insured under its policy as 
i'. :-.as no~ obligated itself to pay anything. The insured would have no 
right against defendant-insurer and, therefore, it does not make sense to 
s8eak of subrogation to any right of the insured against defendant. Con-
'equently, under the Pennsylvania Rule, plaintiff in the instant case would 
:1ave no right under a theory of subrogation since it is primarily liable having 
co·vered the risk specifically, and under the theory of contribution defendant 
"'.l:>uld still be immune from liability or res pons_ibility until plaintiff's policy 
limit was exhausted. 
The opinion in Blue Anchor Overall Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania 
L'.:'Tlberman's Mut. Ins. Co., 123 A. 2d 413 (Pa. 1956) explains the reasoning 
one application of the Pennsylvania Rule, although it deals with two fire 
<ns·Jrance policies. In discussing the problem of apportioning the loss 
"':'.".veen ::ie two insurers, the court said: 
'F·-::-r example, suppose there is a loss on one item alone, 
.vc- 1-::h is covered by both specific and blanket fire insurance 
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policies. The question arises as to whether the full amount 
of the blanket policy pro-rates with the specific policy to pay 
the loss. Or suppose there is a fire loss on two items, and 
the blanket policy covers both items while the s pee ific 
policy covers only one. How is the loss to be apportioned 
between the two policies? Although different courts have 
applied various solutions to the above described problems, 
in Pennsylvania the rule is clear that where there are specific 
and blanket polices covering the damaged property, the specific 
policy must pay in full, and if they are not sufficient to cover 
the loss, the blanket policies pay the difference up to the amou~ 
of the policies." 
As noted by plaintiff, the Utah Supreme Court has apparently 
adopted the specific vs. general theory, without specifically calling it 
the Pennsylvania Rule. In Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. 
St. Paul Ins. Companies, 20 Utah 2d 95, 433 P.2d 602 (1967), the rule 
was specifically adopted in a dispute as to whether the insurance company 
of the title company or the blanket insurance coverage to Prudential Federal 
Savings constituted the primary insurer. The facts of this case are quoted 
directly from the court's opinion in plaintiffs brief, and it need only be 
repeated that Prudential felt that its loan officer's embezzlement was the 
cause of the loss of the first lien on property which they held a second 
mortgage on, and therefore St. Paul, Prudential's insurer, was obligated 
to pay for the loss under its policy provisions. On the other hand, St. Pac! 
argued that the title insurance was the primary insurer because the failure 
of Prudential to obtain a first lien came about as the result of the negllgenc 
of the title company. As is noted by appellant, the court adopted the posi 
of St. Paul and clearly applied it to the specific vs. general rule articulate: 
as the Pennsylvania Rule in other jurisdictions: 
"The rule having wide applicability provides that where a bl 3 ~'-
-12-
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policy contains a provision limiting its liability to an excess 
over specific insurance, the blanket policy must res pond, only 
if the specific fails to satisfy the loss." 433 P. 2d at 603. 
The Utah Supreme Court has on at least two occasions adopted the 
specific vs. general theory with respect to automobile liability policies. 
The first of these cases is National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. 
v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P. 2d 786 (1963). In that 
case, National Farmers was the liability insurer under an au to mobile 
insurance policy with one Morgan. Farmers Insurance Group was the 
automobile liability insurer of one Thomas, a car salesman. Morgan 
took his automobile to the automobile business where Thomas worked to 
have it repaired. The repair required the car to be left there overnight 
and Thomas, who worked there, offered his own automobile to Morgan 
to take home. After Morgan arrived at his ha> me, for some unexplained 
reason the car rolled out of the driveway and crashed into the building 
, 
of a Mr. Wolfe. Wolfe brought an action against Morgan to recover for 
damages to his building. Farmers Insurance Group, covering the owner 
of the car, Thomas, denied coverage and refused to defend, and subse-
quently, National Farmers took on the defense of the action wherein it 
Prevailed. Then, National Farmers brought a suit against Farmers Insurance 
Group under the subrogation theory to recover the costs of the defense of 
the action brought by Wolfe. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court 
ruling that Farmers' policy with Thomas, the owner of the automobile in-
'
0 1'Ted, was primary insurance while the policy of National Farmers with 
'
1
' 'Jan, ti1e c>perator of the automobile involved, was secondary insurance. 
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Because Farmers' policy was primary insurance, it had the obligation to 
defend and therefore the expenses incurred by National Farmers were the 
primary obligation of Farmers Group and therefore National Farmers was e~­
titled to be subrogated and to recover the costs and expenses of the lltiga!i: 
The National Farmers case was cited as controlling authority 
in a subsequent case, Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Utah 2d 
194, 443 P.2d 385 (1968). In that case, Western Casualty and Surety 
Company was the automobile liability insurer of Christensen who was an 
automobile repairman. Farmers Insurance was the automobile liability 
insurer one of Dr. Stevenson. Dr. Stevenson took his car to Christensen 
to have it repaired, but the repair necessitated moving the car to another 
garage. Enroute to the other garage, Christensen was involved in an 
accident wherein a third party lost his life; As in the National Farmers 
case, the Supreme Court found that the owner's policy was primary insurance 
and the operator's policy was secondary insurance. The primary insurer 
thereby had the first obligation to defend the action. 
In Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 21 Utah 2d 358, 
445 P.2d 772 (1968), the court dealt with a fact situation almost identical 
to that in Chris tens en. The main opinion of Justice Henroid discusses only 
the automobile business exclusion also discussed in the National Farme.l§. 
and Christensen cases, but made no mention of the primary-secondary 
question. However, Chief Justice Ellett, in a concurring opinion, said 
that the holding in National Farmers Union and Christensen required that 
the court hold that the insurance issued to the owner of the car was primar 
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insurance and that of the driver, secondary insurance. 
The foregoing Utah cases provide strong support for defendants 
position that the specific vs. general rule should be applied to the facts 
ti: of the instant case, and therefore plaintiff must assume primary liability 
nee 
up to the face amount of its policy. Not only does the case law support 
an adoption of the rule but it should be emphasized strongly that the 
specific vs. general concept is the better reasoned rule among all of those 
available, including the minority rule that is favored by plaintiff. Some of 
the important policy reasons for adopting the specific vs. general concept 
are elaborated by the Louisiana court which is the latest jurisdiction to 
adopt the Pennsylvania Rule. Fasullo v. American Druggist Ins. Co., 
262So. 2d 810 (La. App. 1972), dealt with some fire insurance policies, 
the defendant's policy insuring only that portion of the building designated 
as the retail drug store and other personal property therein, and the other 
policies covering the entire building including the personal property owned 
by Fasullo and the J. P. Wholesale Drug Company. The court, after con-
sidering the arguments on both sides with regard to apportioning the damages, 
Said: 
"However, after a careful review of the various alternatives 
about policy pro-ration, we are convinced that the proper 
formula to be used is that which has commonly been designated 
as the Pennsylvania Rule, which provides that in a case such 
as the one now posed for our consideration the specific policy 
must bear the entire loss on the portion of the premises which 
it covers up to its face amount, with the blanket policy or 
policies affording residual or excess coverage to the extent 
of their respective limits of liability. "262 So. 2d at 815. 
fhe Louisiana court in Fasullo, goes on in the course of its 
'~inir:·n to mention several public policy reasons or advantages to the 
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..... 
adoption and administration of the Pennsylvania Rule as opposed to other 
rules of pro-ration. The first and most important of those advantages ls 
the simplicity and ease of ad ministration of the Pennsylvania Rule which w 
in the opinion of the Louisiana court result in far less litigation than othe: 
rules. In subsequent cases, the principle is forever made clear that wher2 
one insurer has insured against one specific risk, it will be held to pay me: 
of the full amount of the policy and resulting litigation of the kind involvec 
in the instant case over questions of pro-ration among two or even three 
or four insurers would be eliminated. A second advantage mentioned by the 
Louisiana court is that the Pennsylvania Rule tends to grant more coverage 
to the insured in a multi-carrier situation. This is particularly true with 
fire insurance policies where different policies cover different pieces of pr: 
belonging to the same insured. 
It is important to note when one talks about important policy rea' 
for the adoption of the Pennsylvania Rule, that all of the advantages listec 
on page 12 and 13 in plaintiff's brief for the adoption of the minority rule 
are equally attainable by the "Pennsylvania Rule". The important differenc; 
is that the Utah court has specifically chosen to ado pt the "specific vs. 
general" concept, and as noted by plaintiff the court has categorically re-
2" . jected the minority position in the case of Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah •· 
417 P.2d 658 (1966). Also contrary to plaintiff's statement, the rule is th2 
most practical and logical of the two rules to apply, while still maintain!:.: 
the concept that one insurer is primarily liable for the loss. Under the 
minority pro-rata rule it very often is the case that all of the insurers ·C 
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quired to pro-rate sit off in the wings and wait for the other companies to 
:nave forward and make the first payment. The Pennsylvania rule identifies 
'he primary insurer and there is no aues tion then which company has the du~y 
'O move forward. 
Plaintiff takes the position in its brief that even if the "majority 
rule", (whatever that may actually be) , is a pp lied to the instant case de-
fendant would still be liable because of defendants pro-rata provision in 
its policy. Plaintiff claims essentially that in order for the specific vs. 
general rule to apply, the policy must state that it will provide excess in-
surance only should there be concurrent coverage by a specific policy. The 
argument goes on that since there is nothing of that nature in Western' s 
policy, the insurance should be presumed to be primary. However, in 
Fasullo v. American Druggist Ins. Co., supra, all of the policies in that case, 
whether they were ultimately deter mined to be specific or general, con-
tained the same pro-rata clause that is contained in defendants policy. 
The clause reads: 
"This company shall not be liable for a greater proportion 
of any loss than the amount hereby insured shall bear to 
the whole insurance covering the property against the peril 
involved, whether collectible or not. 
Simply put, the Louisiana court did not require that the insurance company 
Which they found to be an excess insurer because of its blanket or general 
00licy, specifically mention in its insurance policy that it will be excess 
::r.l;• 11 there is other insurance covering a s pee ific risk. The true purpose 
'e Jr•,-rr1ta clause and why it did not automatically provide for an action 
-" ibution 'Jr subrogation is covered in the courts opinion: 
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"Moreover, the statutory pro-rata clause merely states that the 
company shall not be liable for a greater percentage of a loss 
than the proportion which its face value bears to the total amoi;r: 
of insurance coverage on the property damaged. This clause 
merely establishes a negative limitation of liability and does 
not set forth an affirmative right to obtain contribution from 
other companies having coverage on the damaged property." 
262 So. 2d at 814. 
It is defendant's position the court was correct in its reasoning that the ins· 
need not indicate that it be excess over other specific insurance, becausec' 
that obvious result where the specific vs. general rule has been adopted, ar. 
that the pro-rata clause contained in respondent's policy does not set fort~ 
an affirmative right to obtain contribution from other companies having cove· 
The specific vs. general concept, cometimes known as the Penn· 
sylvania Rule, has been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court and should aga: 
be applied by the court to the facts of the instant case for all of the reason: 
referred to above . 
POINT III. 
COVERAGE OF THE PARTICULAR RISK INVOLVED IN THIS 
CASE IS EXCLUDED BY SPECIFIC EXCLUSION l (e) OF 
RESPONDENT'S POLICY. 
Plaintiff contends in its statement of facts that coverage under 
either insurance policy is not in dispute. However, in defendants memo· 
randum in support of its motion for summary judgment, in Western's policy, 
exclusion l (e) was specifically relied on as· a bas is for granting the summa: 
judgment. It is defendant's position that this particular exclusion was me: 
apply to this very type of fact situation. The specific language of the ex· 
clusion is as follows: 
"This policy does not apply: 
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"e. To bodily injury or property damage arising out of any 
pre mises, other than an insured premises, owned, rented 
or controlled by any insured. . . " 
The injury involved in the instant case was the result or occurred 
because of a condition of the property involved -- an open gate. It is 
undisputed that the drill grounds property where the accident occurred 
ls not an insured premises under Story's homeowners policy with Western. 
Defendant takes the position that the exclusion is applicable and operates 
to remove defendant from any liability for the damages incurred by Haggen. 
If there is any dispute as to the applicability of this particular 
exclusion, it would originate in the meaning of the phrase "arising out 
of any premises". There is apparently very little case law throughout 
the country defining or applying this term as it relates to uninsured premises 
owned or controlled by the insured. The cases which have most often 
construed the phrase "arising out of" involve a auestion of coverage for 
injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use etc. 
of any motor vehicle owned or operated or rented by the insured. Generally, 
these cases indicate that the term "arising out of" simply requires that there 
be some causal connection between the ownership, maintenance, operation, 
etc. of the automobile and the injury. 
lnMcDonaldv. GreatAmericanins. Co., 224F. Supp. 369, 
ID.c. R.I.). the insured brought a declaratory judgment action to determine 
Whether the insurers were required to conduct the defense of actions brought 
aqair"t th , d af d 
- - e insure by persons claiming injuries as a result the insure 
· ·y rh:own a cherry bomb from an automobile. The court held that a specific 
-19-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
exclusion in Great American Insurance Company's policy, preventing coverac; 
for injuries arising out of the use of automobiles away from the insured Pre-
mises, was applicable and therefore the company had no defense obligation. 
The court in McDonald gave some guidance on the definition oft', 
term "arising out of": 
"In most jurisdictions it is held that for an injury to arise out 
of the use of an automobile within the meaning of an insurance 
policy, it is not necessary that the injury be produced by the 
force of the insured vehicle itself. It is sufficient tha the use 
of the automobile be 'connected with the accident or the creation 
of the condition that caused the accident'. (Omit citations)" 
224 F. Supp. at 372. 
In Carter v. Bergeron, 160 A. 2d 348 (N .H. 1960), the court 
construed the term "arising out of" to mean: 
"It is sufficient that the use was 'connected with the accident 
or the creation of a condition that caused the accident ... '" 
160 A. 2d at 354. 
It is generally recognized that whatever causal connection is 
required between the condition of the premises and the accident or the 
injuries, it need not amount to proximate legal cause. See Manufacturers 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Casualty Co., 170 A.2d 571 (Pa.1961) 
Brenner v. Aetna Ins. Co. , 445 P. 2d 4 7 4 (Ariz. 19 68); 12 Couch on Insurance 
2d, §45:56. 
A case that is much more factually helpful than the automobile 
cases referred to above is Jackson v. Lajuanie, 253 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 
1971). The exclusion in that case was almost identical to the language 
in res pendent' s policy in the instant case. The exclusion read: 
"To any act or omission in connection with premises, other 
than as defined, which are owned, rented or controlled by 
an insured. . . • " 
-20-
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As discussed above, the term "arising out of" and the term 
"connected with", are treated by many of the cases as being synonymous. 
In Jackson where the injury involved an accidental shooting, the issue 
was whether the shooting was "an act or omission in connection with 
premises". Apparently the insured, while working at a service station, 
pointed a gun at the plaintiff which he thought was loaded with blanks, 
The gun discharged and injured the plaintiff. 
The insurer, Continental Insurance Company, relied upon the 
exclusion auoted above for avoiding liability, and the Louisianna court 
upheld Continental' s position. The court explains that the basic intention 
of a comprehensive liability policy like the homeowner' s policy which was 
involved is to cover the insured for all sums which he may become legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage. 
But, the policies contain several exclusions which the court says are of 
two different kinds. The one type of exclusion is concerned with activities 
of the insured as they relate directly to other persons. The court explains 
that such exclusions involve the person to person activities which would 
include intentional torts and business pursuits. The other type of exclusion 
is concerned with premises of the insured as the condition of such premises 
might relate to other persons. That type of exclusion is exactly the type 
that Exclusion 1 (e) of Western' s policy fits under. The court in Jackson went 
on to explain that such exclusionary clauses and the clause involved in that 
case particularly: 
"Restrict coverage where liability is incurred because of the 
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condition of the premises owned, rented or controlled by the 
insured, other than those defined, where the condition is 
attributable to the act or omission of the insured." 253 S.2d 
at 545. 
The Jackson case is very strong support for Westerns position 
that the bodily injury in the instant case arose out of premises other than 
an insured premises, owned, rented or controlled by the insured. Because 
the instant facts involve a gate being left open on the premises, it ls proba8i 
an easier case to find a causal connection between the premises and the 
injury than is true with Jackson where a gun accidentally discharged at the 
uninsured premises. 
Again, all that seems to be required by Jackson and the other cltec 
cases for the exclusion to apply is some causal connection between the 
condition of the uninsured premises and the injury or damages involved and 
ownership or control by the insured. In light of this, an argument that it was 
the negHgrnce of Story and not the condition of the premises that caused the 
accident is an argument that cannot stand. 
The meaning of the exclusion in the instant case could be more 
accurately and clearly stated thus: To bodily injury or property damage 
arising out of the rental, ownership or control by any insured of any premise: 
other than the insured premises. That is, if the injury arose out of the pre~:i 
it must have arisen because of some negligent act or omission on the part 0' 
someone in control of or responsible for the property. In this case, it 
was an o~n gate that was the cause of the injury. Exel us ion 1 (e) ctearlY 
applies in this case and Western is not liable either under its personal 
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liability coverage or the medical payments coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed because: 
1. Brent G. Story was a co-insured under the policy issued by 
91aintiff and therefore plaintiff is not entitled to recover any amount from 
defendant because an insurer may not bring an action and recover against 
lts own co-insured or the co-insured' s additional insurer, under either a 
theory of subrogation or contribution. 
2. Furthermore, even if plaintiff was allowed to bring an action 
against its co-insured and thereby an action against the co-insured' s 
additional insurance company, defendant is not liable in this case because 
of the specific vs. general theory or the "Pennsylvania Rule" which has 
been°adopted in Utah and which is the better reasoned rule to apply. Because 
plaintiff has is sued a policy to specifically cover the particular risk and loss 
, 
involved in the instant case, and defendant's policy provided only general 
or blanket coverage, plaintiff's coverage is primary and defendant ·s coverage 
is excess and plaintiff must bear the entire loss up to the face amount 
of its policy. 
3. Finally, contrary to plaintiff's contention, there is a dispute 
as to whether coverage is provided for the particular risk involved in this 
case by defendants policy. It is defendant's position that the coverage is 
excluded bys pecific Exclusion 1 (e) of its policy which states the policy 
does not "PPly to bodily injury or property damage arising out of any premises, 
'
1 ;;n insured premises, owned, rented or controlled by any insured. 
-23-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The term "arising out of" means a "causal connection with", and the better 
reasoned cases would find that Story s negligence in leaving the gate open 
at the drill grounds or uninsured premises, resulted in injury arising out 
of the uninsured premises. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of September , 1977. 
STRONG AND HANNI 
,,......, I I 
. _J ..J.. . 
~\.<:::::_.. ....-- " ~ ··'--'-"-----
GLENN C • HANNI 
~ / .-.-L/ I~//. //'\ . ---·~ :;._,. ~~ 
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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